Prospecting for war: 9/11 and selling the Iraq War by Masters, Daniel S. & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina Wilmington
Prospecting for War: 9/11 and Selling the Iraq War 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By: 
 
Daniel Masters 
Department of Public and International Affairs 
University of North Carolina Wilmington 
601 S. College Rd. 
Wilmington, NC 28403 
mastersd@uncw.edu 
 
Robert M. Alexander 
Department of History, Politics, and Justice 
Ohio Northern University 
Hill Memorial 202A 
Ada, Ohio 45810 
r-alexander@onu.edu 
 
 
Word Count: 9,733 
 
 
 
NOTE: 
 
This article was originally published in Contemporary Security and is cited as follows: Masters, 
D., & Alexander, R. M. (2008). Contemporary Security, 29 (3), 434-452. Retrieved from  
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/856309538-
59327469/content~content=a906240658~db=all~tab=content~order=page%20–. 
 
 1 
Prospecting for War: 9/11 and Selling the Iraq War 
 
 
Current literature on the foreign policy process focuses almost entirely on elite packaging of 
foreign policy prospects with little or no attention on why the general population may accept or 
reject those options. Thus, a more complete understanding of the foreign policy process requires 
knowing the conditions under which when people will accept the foreign policy sales pitch. We 
propose using prospect theory–a model of decision-making that suggests people are inclined to 
escalate risks to avoid or recover losses—in order to understand the way in which context and 
emotions shape perceptions and support of foreign policy options. Prospect theory helps to 
explain the significance of elite behaviors like threat inflation, which are designed to link 
discrete foreign policy actions to conditions related to intensely emotional events in order to 
advance a preferred policy. To illustrate the utility of prospect theory to the foreign policy 
process we turn to the Iraq War policy process, and why the Bush Administration found a 
receptive audience to its public sale of the war. This study concludes that perceived losses in the 
security condition of the United States caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks provided a context, or 
reference point, used to frame the decision for war with Iraq. Moreover, the public sale of the 
war involved an effort by Senior Administration Officials to link Saddam Hussein to terrorism 
and 9/11 in order to cast a particular frame that was more likely to illicit risk-seeking behavior 
from the general population. This, combined with a collapse in elite opposition that could 
counter-frame the option for war, contributed to an alignment in public perceptions of terrorist 
threats and support for the proposition of an offensive war with Iraq as a prospect to escape the 
threat of terrorism. 
   
 
Introduction 
Military ventures are routinely portrayed in a macro-security framework that defines threats and 
establishes foreign policy priorities. The macro-security framework is used to build support 
among the general population for military action. In the recent past, the Cold War framework 
defined U.S. military undertakings throughout the world—including, the Middle East, Asia, and 
Eastern Europe. Today, the ‗War on Terrorism‘ narrative appears to have replaced the Cold War 
narrative, defining military endeavors in Afghanistan
1
, Iraq, and may yet serve to define a 
military mission in Iran. We are most interested in the run up to war with Iraq.  Popular accounts 
suggest that the push for the Iraq War was couched as an extension of the war on terrorism more 
broadly and specifically linked to the events of 9/11.
2
 We analyze why the general population 
was inclined to accept the war on terror narrative framing of the Iraq war.  Specifically, we seek 
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to answer how and why 9/11 affected the public sale of the Iraq War. If we can fully appreciate 
the conditions under which the general population accepts elite framing of public policy choices, 
we can better grasp the dynamics of foreign policy decision making in open societies.     
What we know to this point is that the campaign for the Iraq War involved a process of 
issue framing. Issue framing is best described as a manner where elites emphasize…―a subset of 
potentially relevant considerations when constructing their opinions‖.
3
 Issue framing involves 
weaving exogenous circumstances into a separate problem in order to advance a preferred 
perspective regarding the issue. By linking 9/11 to Iraq, the prospect of a discrete offensive war 
takes on defensive characteristics as part of a larger war on terrorism. As the argument goes, 
through the Iraq War the United States would better secure itself from the growing threat of 
terrorism.  Although this synopsis may explain the issue frame presented by the Bush 
administration, it fails to account for why the public was willing to accept the frame.   
In order to understand why the general population accepted the 9/11-Iraq linkage as a 
frame for the war we turn to prospect theory. This model of decision making suggests people are 
inclined to accept risks they would otherwise reject when the perceived structure of options is a 
choice between competing losses. One explanation of the public‘s acceptance of the Iraq War is 
found by examining the impact of 9/11 on the security outlook of the general population. The 
attacks resulted in a lost sense of security among the general populace that was exploited by the 
Bush Administration to support an option (the Iraq War) that citizens would not have otherwise 
chosen.  Linking 9/11 with Iraq inflated feelings of insecurity among the general population, 
especially in regard to the Iraqi threat. The inflated insecurity was fueled by the Bush 
administration‘s rhetoric, but made possible due to the way humans process decisions.  In this 
context, the Iraq War becomes a choice between competing losses: One could accept the post-
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9/11 conditions as they were (a sure loss of security caused by 9/11) or engage in an offensive 
war against Iraq (a gamble to improve security after 9/11). In short, 9/11 provided the necessary 
context that allowed the Iraq War to advance as a policy option.  The policy frame exploited the 
way humans process choices, thus encouraging an option the public would not have otherwise 
likely have adopted—the option to support war in Iraq.   
This study unfolds in three parts. First, we review the extant scholarship regarding the 
onset of the Iraq War noting that present studies analyze the way the war was framed to the 
public, not why the public was willing to accept the frame. Second, we propose a prospect theory 
model of decision-making in relation to the foreign policy-making process.  Doing so enables us 
to focus more exclusively on the elite-mass dynamic involved in moving foreign policy options 
forward. Finally, we examine public opinion data on threat perception, support for the Iraq war, 
and popular beliefs about the likelihood of terrorist attacks if the United States failed to take 
action against Iraq in order to ascertain the degree to which context and emotion shaped popular 
support or the war. We believe prospect theory provides an accurate understanding of why 
Americans were so amenable to siding with the Bush administration‘s claims to invade Iraq. In a 
more general sense prospect theory proves useful for understanding elite mobilization behavior 
and the conditions under which the masses are most susceptible to framing effects. In other 
words, when elites successfully link unrelated foreign policy actions into a  security framework 
based upon a tangible perception of losses (like insecurity caused by an attack), combined with a 
collapse in elite counter-framing (where public monologues supersede dialogues), it will likely 
result in broader acceptance of objectively risky foreign policy actions. The study indicates that 
conditions leading to the Iraq War were a ―perfect storm‖ of events, but such conditions are not 
unique to the Iraq War case. For example, there is similarity in the Iraq case, with Russia‘s 
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response to terrorist bombings in Moscow (1999) used to justify military actions in Chechnya, 
among others    
 
Background 
Policy making is a process that generally involves an elite-to-masses dynamic. The final policy 
decisions are made within the confines of the elite governing circles (however defined by the 
polity). Before a decision can be taken, a process develops to advance a particular agenda item 
and a preferred policy formulation. We refer to this period as the public sale period.  The public 
sale, requires a mobilization process, involving efforts to increase public support for policy 
decisions and implementation.
4
 When analyzing mobilization we, as scholars, tend to focus our 
attention on elite behavior as it relates to agenda setting, and ignore the masses as an important 
ingredient. However, to fully appreciate how policy preferences are advanced and implemented, 
it would serve us well to devote some attention to mass behavior as it relates to agenda setting. 
Clearly, mass support is relevant to elevating preferred agenda items. To date, the vast majority 
of studies on decision making regarding the Iraq War focus on the Bush administration‘s 
mobilization of public opinion prior to the decision for the Iraq War, with academic treatments 
centered particularly on agenda-setting, patriotism, and the framing of the Iraqi regime as one 
that was tied to the larger war on terror.  In each instance, attention is focused on the elite-to-
masses input ignoring the masses-to-elites feedback.    
For instance, Michael Mazaar argues that John Kingdon‘s model of agenda-setting, and 
groupthink are the most relevant aspects to the Iraq War policy process.
5
 Many key actors in the 
Bush administration were advocates of removing Saddam Hussein from power prior to Bush‘s 
ascendancy to the presidency.  Mazaar asserts that 9/11 provided the policy window to carry out 
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a long-awaited plan to depose Saddam Hussein.  The terrorist attacks on 9/11 serve as focusing 
events to provide the catalyst for action that enables policy entrepreneurs to more feasibly sell 
their desired courses of action. Mazaar further notes that the problems of groupthink are 
especially potent during the very crises that stimulate policy windows.  In regard to Iraq he 
argues that ―when an option is worked out in advance and slipped into policy during a crisis, this 
case suggests, it will not be subject to sufficiently rigorous debate.‖
6
   Much evidence suggests 
that the lack of debate found within the administration was echoed in the political arena as few 
elites challenged the move to invade Iraq.        
In a more nuanced way Jon Western, and Ronald Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz, separately 
develop lines of thought on elite mobilization of public opinion by citing the executive-branches 
agenda setting advantage, executive cohesion, fragmentation in the opposition, and a convoluted 
presentation of the Iraq regime‘s past behavior as essential to the public sale of the Iraq War.
7
 
Specifically, Western asserts that public opinion is (in part) dependent on available information 
which is transmitted through by elites such as the President of the United States and senior 
administration officials.
8
 The Bush administration selectively used intelligence to present 
particular versions of evidence to support the war policy, and was actively supported by 
neoconservative intellectuals, to dominate the policy discussion in their favor.
9
 Meanwhile, 
Krebs and Lobasz indicate that any elite opposition from Democrats in Congress was silenced 
because the Bush administration seized the advantage on the rhetorical front to define war in Iraq 
as part of the war on terror, thereby silencing opposition as opponents realized their rhetorical 
counterbalance would not gain traction in the post-9/11 threat environment.
10
    
Another stream of research focuses on the significance of patriotic feelings in the wake of 
9/11.  It is suggested that the dramatic increase in support President Bush received after 9/11 
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emboldened his administration‘s more hawkish stance toward Iraq.  As noted above, a great deal 
of evidence suggests that members of the Bush administration had been concerned with regime 
change in Iraq for over a decade.  Thus, the 9/11 attacks served as a focusing event providing the 
window to launch the long awaited offensive against Iraq.  Prior to these attacks, Bush‘s 
approval rating was around 50%.  After the attacks, his rating soared to nearly 90%.  Marc 
Hetherington and Michael Nelson note that this increase nearly doubled the surge George H. W. 
Bush received prior to the Gulf War (1990-1991).
11 
They further note that in the wake of 9/11, 
George W. Bush received the highest approval rating of any president in history and the degree 
of patriotic support he enjoyed seemed to last longer than any previous president.   
When considering the significance of patriotism in the public‘s support for the Iraq War, 
Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner conclude that ―while the rally-around-the-flag phenomenon 
likely played a role in support for the war in Iraq, the levels of support for this war were so high 
and so largely unconditional that spontaneous patriotism alone cannot account for it‖.
12
 
Consequently, they suggest that the administration‘s rhetoric was responsible for support of the 
Iraq War. Their content analysis of the president‘s speeches demonstrate that Bush was 
successful in his framing of a preemptive war against Iraq as intimately related to the war on 
terror.  
In sum, scholarly treatment of the Iraq War policy process has been dominated by a one-
way discussion on the elite dynamics.  While helpful, these treatments fail to account for why the 
American citizenry ultimately supported the decision for war. Gershkoff and Kushner accurately 
identify that issue framing contributed to the public‘s acceptance of the Iraq War, but rhetorical 
analysis can only take us so far. Understanding why the rhetoric found support is critical a deeper 
understanding as to why certain policy options move ahead in the public agenda. It is in the gap 
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between rhetoric and public acceptance of that rhetoric that prospect theory is most informative 
and useful for understanding the decision-making process that led to the Iraq War.  
 
Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy 
 
Prospect theory is an inductive theory of decision making derived from experiments in the 1970s 
by psychologists and economists designed to assess the descriptive validity of the basic maxims 
of Subjective Expected-Utility Theory (also known as Rational Choice).
13
 Experiments 
discovered that individuals display sensitivity to changes and particularly to losses. Such 
sensitivities were revealed by tendencies among individuals towards loss aversion. Loss aversion 
is important as it impacts decisions causing people to reverse preferences (based on context), and 
forgo value maximizing/loss minimizing behavior commonly predicted by rational choice 
theories. The behavioral anomalies were integrated into an alternative theory of risky choice, 
known as prospect theory. Prospect theory is an empirically based theory of decision making, 
and one that accounts for social context in the decision process without jettisoning the human 
agency component. 
Since its introduction in 1979, prospect theory has been applied to a large number of 
fields including management sciences, investment behavior, American politics, and 
organizational theory.
14
 In the field of international relations, prospect theory has been used to 
analyze foreign policy behavior of states, strategic interactions between states, and served as the 
basis for a unified theories of choice for state behavior replacing the classical relative versus 
absolute gains debates between Realists and Liberals.
15
 It has been used to explain individual and 
group decisions, particularly decisions involving the acceptance or rejection of risky behaviors.
16
 
Most often this model of decision making is used to analyze elite decisions.
17
 However, prospect 
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theory has demonstrated explanatory potential in group conditions
18
 and we believe can help us 
accurately explain why the masses accepted the foreign policy frame and opted to support the 
Iraq War policy.  
 Generally speaking prospect theory is a model of decision-making where the decision 
process involves two steps. First is the editing phase, where options are identified and assigned 
weights as losses or gains.  Second is the evaluation phase, where the prospect with the highest 
value is selected. The evaluation phase is deeply influenced by the way in which prospects are 
edited. People evaluate the desirability of options with an eye to a reference point (some 
condition deemed normal, a status quo, or long established goal). The reference point is 
important for decisions as it defines how people will interpret options and the change from the 
reference point those options represent. People generally assign value to change from the 
reference point as either gains or losses. Defining change in this way matters as people overvalue 
losses relative to gains of equal value. Because losses are overvalued, reactions to losses and 
gains differ.  Individual behavior reflects a general predisposition to avoid losses meaning that 
people will engage in more risk, exert more effort, and persist over longer periods of time to 
avoid losses than to secure gains.  
 The tendency for loss aversion suggests that ―people that do not make peace with losses 
are likely to accept gambles that would be unacceptable otherwise‖.
19
 Consequently, one‘s 
reference point is critical as it determines how a decision or policy option is framed. The framing 
of options matters vis-à-vis the decision weights people attach to the outcomes. Decision weights 
are subjective probability assessments. Generally speaking, certain or impossible outcomes are 
weighted the heaviest. Outcomes that are unlikely receive more weight than they should, while 
likely outcomes receive less weight than they deserve.
20
 Taken together, framing and decision 
 9 
weights suggest that when a choice is viewed as a certain loss versus gambling to avoid loss, 
people are inclined to gamble because it offers the chance to avoid loss. The certainty of a 
positive payoff is not necessary to affect one‘s decision.   
A number of scholars have employed prospect theory as a means to make sense of 
foreign policy decision-making.
21
 Of particular interest to this study is Jeffrey Berejikian‘s claim 
that ―prospect theory contours the domestic political incentive structure that leaders confront‖.
22
  
Likewise, Miroslav Nincic finds that American presidents are rewarded more through public 
support and congressional compliance when military interventions are defined as protective in 
nature (loss avoidance) rather than promotive or offensive (gains seeking).
23
 Thus, presidents are 
more inclined to frame foreign actions as protective over promotive, and try harder to sell 
protective actions.
24 
Such behavioral tendencies imply some level of awareness that the public is 
apt to concede more for protective actions, and that political leaders respond to this environment 
in ways that will best advance their preferred policy options. In sum, foreign policy is likely to 
advance when it successfully taps into, reflects, or generates a perception that the foreign policy 
option best avoids or recovers loss.  
 Prospect theory is a behavioral model of choice derived from experiments on how people 
make choices under conditions of risk. As a theory it stands as one of many competing 
alternatives. Most often prospect theory is contrasted to rational choice theory, which asserts that 
individuals are strategic decision makers tending to maximize their benefits and minimizing 
costs. The rational choice model of decision making was never held as an accurate description of 
human decision making, rather it has been presented as a useful assumption for building 
predictive models. In addition to being a ―useful‖ assumption, rational choice has served as a 
theory of human agency that provides guidelines for making strategic choices.
25
 As for its 
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descriptive  potential, Berejikian offers the following assessment: ―prediction and understanding 
are not the same…a farmer in pre-Copernican times could do quite well in predicting the timing 
of the sunrise and sunset…The farmer‘s model is (in this sense) predictive, but incorrect…and 
would be useless for more complicated tasks.‖
26
 This particular characterization is best 
evidenced by Stephen Borrelli and Brad Lockerbie‘s (2008) study on the Iraq War that notes 
public opinion displays rational aspects, while also implying emotional and symbolic aspects 
related to framing effects.
27
   
 Prospect theory is also cast as particularly complicated compared to other theories of 
social and human decision making. For instance, threat inflation is often used as a way to explain 
foreign policy outcomes, particularly the Iraq War. Threat inflation asserts that individual 
decisions can be manipulated by way of making claims that go beyond the realm of ambiguity, 
contain consistent patterns of worst case assertions (even if unlikely), evaluate evidence to favor 
worst case threat assessments, and based on circular logic.
28
 Threat inflation clearly occurred 
during the public sale of the Ira war.  However, threat inflation does not explicitly describe why 
the inflated threats would matter to an individual as the target of the rhetoric. Prospect theory is 
useful because it describes the nexus of environmental conditions that frame a decision and the 
internal mechanisms on how people react to the framed decision. Examining the Iraq war though 
the lens of prospect theory allows us to focus our attention away from elites and onto the masses 
as a collection of individuals motivated (largely) by loss aversion.  
 
Framing Effects and Public Attitudes towards the Iraq War   
Using prospect theory to evaluate public attitudes and support for the Iraq War is challenging for 
several reasons. First, to establish that framing effects matter we must ascertain the following: (i) 
 11 
public opinion indicates a perception that the social condition is defined by losses from an 
established reference point (in other words a change in the perception regarding security that is 
significant and sustained since 9/11), and this condition is linked to Iraq; (ii) one option (no war) 
is perceived as a certain loss, which carries the greatest weight in the decision calculus, and (iii) 
the alternative (war) offers a perceived chance to escape the existing loss regardless of the risks 
involved.  
It is worth noting that the behavioral tendencies predicted in prospect theory can be 
diminished, even negated, through counter-framing by elites that challenge any particular policy 
position.
29 
James Druckman has suggested that framing effects are more likely to dominate over 
normal issue framing when heterogeneous discussion among elites is noticeably absent.
30
  When 
a monologue prevails a single position dominates the discussion, which intensifies risk-seeking 
behavior.
31
  Thus, in order for framing effects to matter in any public policy process, the nature 
of public discourse must be compromised in some way giving rise to a public monologue. 
Absent monologue-like conditions, scholars cannot possibly tease out potential framing effects, 
as the policy options that move forward are likely advanced through normal public debate. If, 
however, monologue conditions are present, the public discourse will likely contain elements of 
a polarizing discussion, thereby intensifying framing effects.  
A second challenge to using prospect theory to evaluate foreign policy cases is the source 
and quality of evidence. To best determine the presence of a losses frame requires gathering 
information from the immediate context, which is notoriously difficult to do.
32
 However, we can 
acquire objective evidence through public opinion polls, congressional indicators, public 
statements, and other publicly available data.
33
 For purposes of this study, much of the data 
provided is derived from public opinion polls conducted by Hart-Teeter/NBC News/Wall Street 
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Journal, CBS News/New York Times, PSRA/Pew Poll, ABC News/Washington Post, 
PSRA/Newsweek, and CNN/Time Magazine from May 2002 to March 2003. All polling data is 
available through the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.
34
  
Introducing public opinion polling data does open some potential avenues of criticism, as 
does the application of prospect theory to a collective rather than an individual. First, studies on 
prospect theory often involve individual level experimental methods, or elite case studies. 
However, a number of experiments and case studies have demonstrated that the predictions of 
prospect theory are not exclusive to individual level scenarios. The literature suggests loss averse 
behavior is present in group situations, and that group conditions actually intensify framing 
effects.
35
 whether this applies to the masses is up for debate, and worthy of study. We follow the 
conclusions of Druckman that when public debate involves a monologue (like the present case) 
framing effects are prevalent. When public debate involves a dialogue, framing effects may not 
be as prevalent.
36
 Finally, the experimental design common to most studies involving prospect 
theory do control for internal validity best, while aggregated public opinion data does not possess 
the same assurances.
37
 However, this study‘s application of public opinion polling data in order 
to evaluate the potential applicability of framing effects is not unique.
38
 Moreover, the 
application of thousands of ―aggregate poll results in the public domain are a woefully 
underutilized resource‖ for studying framing effects.
39
 With these caveats in mind, we turn to the 
editing phase of the decision making process.   
 
Editing the Iraq War Decision 
Our analysis of public attitudes toward the Iraq War begins with the reference point and the 
frame used to evaluate the war/no-war options among citizens.  The reference point for the Iraq 
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War is the public assessment of homeland security. The frame used to evaluate the war/no-war 
option is the change to homeland security following the 9/11 attacks. We make this claim based 
on the following evidence. First, from 1955 to 1998 there were 11 deaths related to foreign 
terrorist activity inside the U.S. accounting for only 2.2 percent of all domestic terrorism related 
deaths.
40
 Terrorist threats on U.S. targets overseas were mounting during the 1990s with attacks 
by al-Qaeda in 1996 (Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia), 1998 (U.S. Embassies in Eastern Africa), 
and 2000 (U.S.S. Cole in Yemen). The increasing number of attacks indicates an emergent 
terrorist threat, but perception of that threat does not appear on the home front pre-9/11.  
Second, the 9/11 terrorist attacks are a demarcation point where external threats crash 
through and alter public attitudes on homeland security resulting in a perception of losses and the 
emergence of a losses frame. Survey data gathered pre and post-9/11 by Roy Eidelson and Mary 
Plummer indicate an 18.25 percent increase in perceived vulnerability following the attacks 
suggesting a major short-term shift in perceptions of homeland security.
41
 Similarly, Leona 
Huddy, Nadia Khatib and Theresa Capelos report that in late September 2001, seventy-eight 
percent of Americans believed a future terrorist attack was likely. Threat perceptions remained 
robust into early 2002 with 62 percent of poll respondents stating they believed another terrorist 
attack was likely.
42
 Hence, the pre-9/11 security condition most likely is the reference point for 
individuals (the condition deemed normal, the status quo, or ideal state) and will serve as the 
anchor for the Iraq war decision.  
The post-9/11 security condition represents a shift from the pre-9/11 security condition 
creating the perception of losses that shapes the way in which the war/no-war prospects are 
evaluated. The post-9/11 shift in the perception of security is in a negative direction illustrated by 
a lingering belief that more terrorist attacks were coming. Taken together, the public opinion 
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polling data (pre and post-9/11) suggest the presence of a losses frame among the general 
population based on the new security condition.     
Feelings of insecurity stimulate a number of emotional responses among people that 
affect their evaluation of policy options and risk orientations. In general, individuals display 
belligerence in the face of terrorist attacks. Feelings of injustice increase as people react to their 
perceived status as a victim of mistreatment. It is common to observe an increase in distrust 
taking the form of presumed hostility and malicious intent by others combined with feelings of 
superiority over others. We observe a decline in helplessness as people come to believe they 
have an ability (or need) to influence or control events.
43
 Such a complex of emotions are clearly 
present among the American population, and manifest in the form of support for militarized 
reaction to 9/11. Support for war against Afghanistan ranged from 65 to 90 percent, depending 
on the rate of anticipated casualties.
44
  
Support for a war with Afghanistan is expected as it was the country most directly linked 
to the 9/11 attacks. The question we are confronted with is ‗how belligerence targeted at 
Afghanistan can help to understand public support for extended military action against Iraq?‘ 
The answer to this question lies in the nexus where issue framing (mobilization of public support 
for a preferred foreign policy) taps into, reflects, or creates the perception that extended military 
action in Iraq would additionally alleviate perceived post-9/11 insecurity, resulting in a framing 
effect. Thus, the Iraq war/no-war frame is seen in the context of losses related to the post-9/11 
homeland security environment.  
The empirical evidence is clear that Bush administration officials conflated Iraq with 
terrorism generally, and 9/11 specifically, suggesting an intent to link general support for a 
militarized response to terrorism into a policy toward Iraq.
45
 The pre-war rhetoric by Bush 
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administration officials display a high rate of connectivity between images and terminology of 
terrorism and Iraq.
46
 For example, prior to September 2002, there are few efforts to link Iraq to 
terrorism. However, during the core public sale period for the Iraq War (August 2002 to March 
2003), content analysis of speeches reveal that mentions of Iraq and terrorism moved in the same 
direction suggesting a concerted effort to link Iraq to the war on terror.
47
 For instance, in October 
of 2002 (just prior to the congressional vote to authorize military action in Iraq), President Bush 
stated: ―[Iraq] has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases.‖
48
 
The Bush administration also circulated claims that 9/11 hijacker Mohammad Atta met with 
Iraqi leaders in Prague as late as April 2001.
49 
In his speech to the United Nations President Bush 
stated: ―Iraq‘s government openly praised the attacks of September the 11. And al Qaeda 
terrorists escaped from Afghanistan are known to be in Iraq‖.
50
 Similarly, the president stated 
that: 
On September 11 2001, America felt its vulnerability even to threats that gather 
on the other side of the Earth.  We resolved then, and we are resolved today, to 
confront any threat from any source that could bring sudden terror and suffering 
to America…Confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on 
terror.
51
    
 
In another speech, President Bush articulated the linkage between WMDs and Hussein‘s 
complicity to work with terrorists:  
 
…when they{threats} have fully materialized, it may be too late to protect 
ourselves and our friends and our allies.  By then, the Iraqi dictator would have 
the means to terrorize and dominate the region.  Each passing day could be the 
one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX—nerve gas—or some day a 
nuclear weapon to a terrorist ally.  We refuse to live in the future of fear.
52
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In the 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush asked citizens to ―imagine those 19 
hijackers with other weapons and other plans—this time armed by Saddam Hussein‖.
53
 
Evidence from public opinion data, May 2002 through March 2003 (the beginning of the 
Iraq War), best illustrate the impact of the 9/11-Iraq link. Significant pluralities and majorities of 
Americans believed Iraq was linked to terrorism, with 45-66 percent of poll respondents stating 
they believed Saddam Hussein was involved in 9/11.
54
 The evidence from public opinion polls 
suggests that in terms of public discourse, the Bush Administration successfully wove Iraq and 
terrorism together, creating a particular frame for the decision regarding the war/no-war options.  
 
Evaluating the Iraq War Prospects 
The next stage in applying prospect theory to the Iraq War policy process is to evaluate the 
public attitudes toward the options—war/no war. According to prospect theory, when a decision 
is viewed through a losses frame the option related to certain losses attracts the greatest weight, 
while less weight is attached to the risky option that provides an unlikely chance to escape losses 
altogether. What this means is that the emotional response to the certain loss is strongest and that 
people typically undervalue the riskiness of an alternative because the alternative may allow 
them to escape losses. Therefore, to determine the impact of framing effects on the war/no war 
option we must first determine which option held the heaviest weight. The certain option is 
related to the defined losses and thus provides us with a method for evaluating how the general 
public views the conditions compared to the reference point.  
 As illustrated above, perceptions on the post-9/11 security environment strongly deviated 
from the pre-9/11 condition. About 62 percent of Americans believed another terrorist attack was 
likely as late as February 2002.
55
 Feelings of insecurity have not completely receded in public 
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opinion polls but they do show a decline from June to September of 2002 dropping to an average 
of 56 percent. While not definitive, the data suggest Americans were starting to adjust to the 
changed security environment.  
In mid-September 2002 there is a spike in threat perception (72 percent) as it relates to 
terrorist attacks. Over the next few months (October 2002 to March 2003) when asked ―Do you 
think it is likely there will be another terrorist attack in the United States within the next few 
months?‖
56
 respondents answer in the affirmative at an average of 64 percent, which is 9 
percentage points higher than the pre-September 2002 period. Mobilization for the Iraq War 
begins in September 2002, and October marks a high point in this process when Congress was 
set to make a formal decision regarding the war. In this period, as mentioned above, we notice a 
marked increase in the number of times Iraq and Terrorism are mentioned in terms that connect 
the two items.
57
 In sum, post-9/11 public opinion polls suggest a general perception of loss, and 
this perception of lost security persists over a period of time, but spiked (noticeably) in 
September of 2002 and remained at a higher average rate than the pre-mobilization period. It also 
suggests an enduring change in the security perspective of the general American population after 
9/11. Moreover, the insecurity Americans feel over the potential for another terrorist attack are 
generalized beyond the war on terrorism to include Iraq and Saddam Hussein. When poll 
respondents were asked about the result of removing Saddam Hussein from power, a majority 
(51%) thought it would bring a decline in terrorist activity, or in the terrorist threat to the United 
States.
58
  
 The alternative to no war is war with Iraq as a way to escape losses. It is easy to point to 
conditions inside Iraq and suggest the current situation indicates that the choice was risky. 
However, to do so would be through the benefit of hindsight.  There are two indicators that 
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suggest taking offensive military action in March 2003 was a risky option. These indicators 
include: 1) the al-Qaeda threat and 2) the likely increase in terrorist action rather than a 
reduction. 
 The al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan proved to be the direct source of the terrorist attacks 
on 9/11. Yet, the general belief among the American population was that Saddam Hussein was 
also responsible. As the argument went, through the removal of Saddam Hussein, the ability of 
al-Qaeda to act and threaten U.S. interests in the world would be damaged. This logic works if a 
link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda existed. The risk of war would be minimized 
because military action in Iraq would be part of the larger war on terrorism. Under these 
conditions the two-front war (in Afghanistan and Iraq) would be a single operation and less 
risky. Accordingly, if either operation fails while the other succeeds, then the terrorist threat 
would be mitigated. 
Saddam Hussein is not tied to al-Qaeda, however, which makes a war with Iraq a risky 
option. The additional foray into Iraq requires diverting resources from the original front in the 
war on terror. Resources are split between two operations. Though Afghani operations, by this 
time, were being handed over to NATO, the U.S. cannot simply abandon one war for another 
war without repercussions. Taking on two different wars will multiply threats. Any failure, in 
either Iraq or Afghanistan, would result in safe havens for terrorist camps, planning, and 
operations. Therefore, by initiating a second war, the U.S. accepted greater risk and pressure to 
succeed on both fronts.  
  The second risk associated with the Iraq War decision is tied to its impact on the war on 
terrorism. Scholars have examined how regime change relates to terrorist activity.  Generally 
speaking, stable political regimes experience lower levels of terrorist action. Stability, of course, 
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is the key.  When there is instability in the infrastructure of the political system, terrorism 
increases. As political systems change, the institutionalized patterns in the cooptation and 
corporatist arrangements shift as access patterns are rearranged. In the transitional period the 
state is most susceptible to dissident movements generally, and terrorism specifically.
59
  
In Iraq, the immediate goal was regime change to oust the existing leader and create a 
new political system. During the transition it is reasonable to expect that existing political 
institutions would cease to exist or function. New institutions will be created and new patterns of 
authority will be established. The expected outcome is a likely rise in anomic and non-
associational political activity that could turn violent and evolve into various terrorist campaigns. 
Under these conditions, scholars find that new political institutions lack the capacity to absorb 
the demands of society or enforce its edicts to ensure order.  As the authority of an old regime 
collapses, regions within the state are harder to control, creating a failed state condition that can 
allow domestic and foreign terrorist groups to operate.
60
  
Taken together, it is clear that moving forward with regime change in Iraq would likely 
stimulate terrorist activity within the state rather than mitigate it. However, such discussion is 
noticeably absent in the pre-war rhetoric.  This is important given Richard Eichenberg‘s finding 
that public opinion is typically quite solid when it comes to committing troops to causes where 
the citizenry feels they have been threatened.
61
  There is far less support for military ventures 
when it comes to committing American soldiers to act as peacekeepers or working to engage in 
nation-building activities.  Eichenberg states: ―restraining adversaries is popular, but intervention 
in civil wars (or peacekeeping in their aftermath) is generally not‖.
62
 This finding has broad 
implications in the selling of any war.  One would expect advocates of war to emphasize the 
threat that exists and detail how that threat has existed over time.  This is exactly what happened 
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in the months preceding the Iraq War. Opponents of military action would then benefit from 
stressing the post-war problems associated with establishing a new regime. Yet, this debate was 
noticeably absent prior to the Iraq War.  
If to put the two options together (war/no-war) the decision is one that is presented as a 
decision between competing losses. On the one hand, the option no-war reflects accepting a 
certain loss on the part of the masses. This loss is defined by the increased vulnerability 
American‘s feel in the post-9/11 security environment. On the other hand, the option of war 
presents the masses a chance to take control of their security condition, and to address their post-
9/11 feeling of vulnerability and insecurity. The option for war entails risks (mitigating the al-
Qaeda threat and an increase in terrorist activity). The risks associated with war, though high, are 
undervalued relative to the lower probability that the Iraq War would restore security and reduce 
society‘s feelings of vulnerability.  
The public opinion polling data on support for the war and terrorist threat perception 
move in the same direction, suggesting that the Iraq War was viewed through the frame of 9/11. 
Consider responses to the following questions:  
1) ―Do you approve or disapprove of the United States taking military action against Iraq 
to remove Saddam Hussein?‖ (as a measure of support for the risky option),  
 
and:  
 
2) ―Do you think it is there will be another terrorist attack in the United States within the 
next few months?‖ (as a measure of perceived losses or vulnerability post 9/11)  
 
Figure 1 reveals threat perception moves independent of support for the Iraq War prior to 
September 2002. The dashed line in the figure below indicates public support for war with Iraq 
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from May 2002 to March 2003 (question 1 above). The solid line represents threat perception of 
poll respondents during the same period (question 2 above). The trend lines move independently 
until mid-September of 2002, the point at which the Bush Administration begins its mobilization 
effort for the Iraq War policy.   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
During the summer of 2002, the public assessment on future terrorist attacks against the 
U.S. showed a decline from the immediate post-9/11 period (from 62 to 56 percent).  In mid-
September 2002 we observe an immediate spike (72 percent) in threat perception. From 
September 2002 to March of 2003 threat perception remains at an average of 64 percent.  
September is a key point as it marks the period when the public sale of the war moved into its 
most intense phase.  This period saw the administration work to capture public support, obtain 
congressional approval, and establish a U.S. position on military intervention in Iraq for the 
United Nations Security Council.  
Meanwhile, public support for the Iraq War (represented by the dashed line in Figure 1) 
displays a different trajectory. As early as November of 2001, public support for war with Iraq 
was as high as 74 percent.
63
 Public attitudes on the prospect for war eroded to 30.3 percent in 
June of 2002 and rebounded, slightly, throughout July and August. Average support for the war 
in this period was 57 percent (see figure 1). In September, the same period in which terrorist 
threat perceptions increase, we observe an increase in public support for the Iraq War that peaked 
in February 2003. Average support for the war in this period was 64.3 percent, or 7 percentage 
points higher. Finally, public opinion in October of 2002 indicates that a substantial plurality of 
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respondents (47%) believed the war with Iraq would help in the broader war on terrorism.
64 
In 
short, public opinion, during the public sale period, suggests that Americans believed another 
terrorist attack was coming, and came to believe Iraq was involved in 9/11 and was a legitimate 
front in the war on terror.    
Political opposition was non-existent during the months preceding Iraq War and opinion 
leaders ―did not   . . .  do much independently to contain threat inflation‖.
65
  The silence in 
opposition allowed the perception of an Iraqi regime collaborating with terrorists to go 
unchallenged in the American public. This is especially noteworthy given the paucity of credible 
evidence to substantiate the administration‘s claims.   
The collapse in elite competition over the policy frame is attributable to several factors. 
First, Thomas Christie suggests that there were high levels of congruence between the White 
House and mass media‘s agendas on the ―central issues of the war—terrorism, weapons of mass 
destruction, and the assembly of a coalition to prosecute the war‖.
66
 Secondly, the Bush 
Administration made a tactical decision to divert congressional attention on Iraq policy. As early 
as September 2002, the Bush Administration removed Congress from the debate by claiming that 
congressional authorization was not needed to proceed with military action against Iraq. Drawing 
on the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, the administration argued that Congress had given tacit 
authority to the executive branch to move forward against Iraq for its violation of United Nations 
Security Council resolutions.
67
 The Administration‘s salvo forced Congress into debating the 
constitutional authority of Presidential action absent Congressional authorization, rather than 
debating the appropriateness of a war against Iraq. Thus, the debate was not about going to war 
with Iraq, but whether the president needed congressional approval to do so.  While Congress 
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debated the constitutional authority of action, the Bush Administration continued with its public 
sale absent any significant elite counter-framing.  
The collapse of elite competition over the policy frame is significant because counter-
framing disrupts the potential for acceptance. According to prospect theory, individuals tend to 
accept the formulation of prospects, rather than recasting the decision at-hand once it is 
presented to them.
68
 In the face of heterogeneous elite discussion, acceptance tendencies are 
mitigated as multiple frames allow individuals to select among policy options. However, this 
condition was noticeably absent in the 9/11-Iraq case, and ―the administration‘s frame was not 
countered by intense, sustained criticism by either the press or the Democratic Party.‖
69
      
Bringing the discussion of prospect theory and the Iraq War together we note the 
following observations from the public record, including public opinion polling. First, the 
options of war/no-war with Iraq were viewed through a losses frame. That is to say, one option 
(no war) represents accepting sure losses present in the post-9/11 security environment. The 
other option (war) is the prospect that represents the chance to recover losses (regardless of how 
risky the option is). When a decision is viewed this way, prospect theory predicts people will 
likely select the risky option in order to recover losses. Second, the Iraq War and 9/11 are 
independent of each other, but through a concerted effort by Senior Bush Administration 
officials, and a noticeable collapse in public opposition, the two foreign policy issues are linked 
together into a single macro-security framework. Once the two items are linked, the Bush 
Administration is effective at probing public perceptions of threat in order to gin up support for 
the war. Public opinion data suggest threat perceptions and support for the war quit their separate 
trajectories in September 2002 and begin to move together at levels higher than before the public 
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sale period began. This finding suggests the general population accepted the elite framing of 
public policy choices via successfully framing the decision for war as a protective venture.          
 
Conclusion 
The policy making process involves an elite-to-masses dynamic. Before any policy is 
implemented governments must move through a mobilization process, which involves efforts to 
increase public support for preferred policies. When analyzing mobilization there is a tendency 
to focus on the elites and ignore the masses, subjecting ourselves to half-treatments on the policy 
process. To better understand this process it will serve us well to study mass behavior and 
agenda setting. This study is one attempt to analyze mass support for the foreign policy process 
leading to the current Iraq War (2003 to present). Much of the previous work on this topic has 
focused on the elite-to-masses input and ignored the masses-to-elites feedback.    
 In order to understand why the American public opted to support the Iraq War in 2003 we 
turn to prospect theory as a model of decision making. Prospect theory is a model of decision 
making that suggests people are inclined to accept risks they would otherwise reject when the 
perceived structure of options is a choice between competing losses. Prospect theory was 
developed through experiments on decision making at the individual level and has been tested 
numerous times, in cross-cultural conditions, and its predictions are fairly reliable. Applications 
of prospect theory outside the experimental setting are still new, and face many challenges. 
Challenges aside, it is our interest as scholars to apply such theories and see if they contribute to 
our knowledge of the world around us, require adaptations, or simply do not work in real world 
settings. Already, studies demonstrate that prospect theory shapes the policy incentive structure 
for elites; meaning that elites tend to have success in advancing certain policies when they define 
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them in terms of loss avoidance. To that end, we believe that prospect theory offers us some 
understanding of mass behavior in that the general population of a state is likely to support and 
help advance a policy option when that option is perceived as a chance to recover losses.    
In our application of prospect theory to the public sale of the Iraq War in the United 
States (May 2002 to March 2003), we drew upon the public record, including public statements 
of Senior Bush Administration Officials, and public opinion data regarding threat perception 
(belief another terrorist attack was likely) and support for the Iraq War (do you approve of U.S. 
military action against Iraq). Our study finds that the options of war/no-war with Iraq were 
viewed through a losses frame. That is to say, the option of ―no war‖ was akin to accepting a 
sure loss, which is defined as perceived vulnerability in the post-9/11 world. Meanwhile, the 
option of ―war‖ is seen as the risky option that offers a chance to recover losses. The war option 
is risky because a war with Iraq diverts attention and resources from al-Qaeda (placing greater 
pressure on the U.S. to win both wars) and the military goal of regime change in Iraq is likely to 
increase terrorist activity, at least in the short-term. Prospect theory predicts that when people 
view a decision as a choice between competing losses they will likely select the risky option.  
An underlying issue in this study relates to how 9/11 and Iraq become linked as foreign 
policy items. Objectively the Iraq War and 9/11 are independent of each other. A concerted 
effort by Senior Bush Administration officials and a noticeable collapse in elite opposition, 
allows the two foreign policy issues to come together into single macro-security framework. 
Once linked, the Bush Administration is effective at probing threat perceptions to mobilize 
support for the war. Public opinion data suggest threat perceptions and support for the war quit 
their separate trajectories in September 2002 and began to move together at levels higher than 
before the public sale period began. This finding suggests the general population accepted the 
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elite framing of public policy choices.  We cannot determine if the American public would still 
have accepted the war absent the 9/11 security condition. Nonetheless, the concerted effort by 
administration officials to link terrorist threats to Iraq suggests an understanding that the best 
chance at moving the Iraq War policy option forward required the masses believe the policy was 
inextricably linked to the war on terror macro-security framework.   
Implications of our analysis suggest that leaders find willing audiences among 
populations that have had real security losses.  These losses cause individuals to process 
information under a different context—thus more willing to accept risky behaviors.  Our analysis 
suggests that we need to not only look at those under lost security, but those who are the targets 
of the counterterrorist response.  Certainly, those individuals also feel lost security and they, too, 
are more willing to engage in risky behavior, rather than diplomacy.  Such an understanding, 
suggests that fighting a war on terror poses significant problems due to the way humans process 
information.     
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